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Abstract
In his 2009 monograph, Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection,
Peter Godfrey-Smith accuses biologists of demonstrating ‘Darwinian
Paranoia’ when they engage in what he dubs ‘agential thinking’. But
as Daniel Dennett points out, he offers neither an illuminating set of
examples nor an extended argument for this assertion, thus deeming
it to be a brilliant propaganda stroke against what is actually a useful
way of thinking. Compared to the dangers of teleological thinking
in biology, the dangers of agential thinking have unfortunately rarely
been discussed. Drawing on recent work by Samir Okasha, I attempt
to remedy this omission, through analyzing the nature of agential
thinking, and providing a philosophical treatment of the unexamined
dangers in this peculiar, yet tempting way of thinking.
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Maynard Smith’s book Evolution and the Theory of Games di-
rected game theorists’ attention away from their increasingly elab-
orate definitions of rationality. After all, insects can hardly be
said to think at all, and so rationality cannot be so crucial if
game theory somehow manages to predict their behavior under
appropriate conditions.
– Ken Binmore, foreword in Weibull (1995, p. x)
1 Introduction
Humans have long shown a special kind of interest in the behaviour of other
animals. Diverse species are kept in zoos and aquariums, drawing visitors
from far and wide. While typical documentaries are produced for niche au-
diences, animal documentaries reach much larger crowds, sometimes even
played in cinemas. A striking feature of such documentaries is the colourful
storytelling from figures such as David Attenborough, who can reach an al-
most cult-like level of fame. Their voice-overs turn animal behaviour - such
as the refusal of Capuchin monkeys to receive small rewards when others in
their group receive much larger ones (see Brosnan and De Waal 2002) - into
rational actions, interesting plots, and stories that can compete with the best
dramas, thrillers, romance, and of course comedy movies. To most, these an-
thropomorphising descriptions - the intentional language that portrays the
animals as complex human-like agents - appear as nothing more than fantasy
or fiction merely used for their educational or entertainment value.
As several philosophers of biology have pointed out, however, evo-
lutionary biologists themselves also often use such intentional language to
treat both biological entities and the process of natural selection as agents
(see Wilson 2005; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Walsh 2015; Okasha 2018). Talk of
agents is positively rampant within evolutionary biology, as can be seen in
evolutionary game theory, signalling theory, behavioural ecology, and life-
history theory. When pressed, many evolutionary biologists, such as Richard
Dawkins (1976; 1986), will inevitably deflect the use of this language as be-
ing merely metaphorical.1 After all, teleological thinking as the received
view in evolutionary biology has been banished since the advent of Darwin.
1Which is not to say that metaphors don’t play important roles in science (see Veit
and Ney 2021).
2
Speaking of purposes in a submission to a biology journal is highly likely
to be criticized by reviewers, if not desk rejected out of hand. Daniel Den-
nett (2011; 2017) has attributed at least part of this anti-teleology attitude
- i.e. the unwillingness to talk about purpose and design that is seemingly
operating in nature - to a political motivation. This is not an unreasonable
suggestion. Biologists, after all, may understandably be quite reluctant to
give up any ground in the battle against advocates of creationism and intel-
ligent design. But it is also precisely for this reason that a few evolutionary
biologists such as Andy Gardner (2009) positively maintain that “in light of
the current incarnation of creationism—which styles itself as ‘intelligent de-
sign’—evolutionary biologists should not shrink from addressing the central
problem of adaptation” and put “an effort to emphasize that Darwinism is
the only scientific theory of biological design” (p. 864). Among philosophers
the teleology debate is similarly far from settled, despite a now extensive lit-
erature on the topic. In fact, one may even consider it as one of the paradigm
cases among the set of subjects that doctoral students are warned from engag-
ing in, due to the difficulty of making a substantive contribution.Proponents
of teleological thinking in the biological sciences, as Daniel Dennett (2017)
points out, must regularly deal with epithets such as “Darwinian paranoia”
(Francis 2004; Godfrey-Smith 2009) and “conspiracy theorists” (Rosenberg
2011).2 Dennett deems such labels to be “brilliant propaganda stroke[s]”
against teleological thinking (2011, p. 481), but doubts that they have any
real bite to them.
In this paper, I am not concerned with the role of teleology in biology,
per se, but a special sort of teleological thinking that seems to have survived
pretty much intact within evolutionary biology: i.e. talk of agents and goals.
Though R.A. Wilson labelled such intentional language merely a “cognitive
metaphor” (2005, p. 75), Samir Okasha’s (2018) recent monograph Agents
and Goals in Evolution has elegantly shown that there is more to it than
this.3 Instead, it is a particular way of thinking about evolution, one dubbed
‘agential’ by Peter Godfrey-Smith:
Here we think of evolution in terms of a contest between entities with
agendas, goals, and strategies. I see the agential view of evolution
as something of a trap. It has real heuristic power in some contexts,
2See Dennett’s From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds (2017, p.
34).
3See Veit (forthcomingb) for a recent essay review.
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but also has a strong tendency to steer us wrongly, especially when
thinking about foundational issues. And once we start thinking in
terms of little agents with agendas—even in an avowedly metaphorical
spirit—it can be hard to stop.
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 5)
This warning against agential thinking is one of Godfrey-Smith’s main mes-
sages in his 2009 book Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. Though
elaborated less than other ideas within it, Dennett’s (2011) has gone so far as
to call it the book’s punch-line. While highly praising Godfrey-Smith’s con-
tribution as “the best, most thought-provoking book in the philosophy of bi-
ology” that he has “read in a long time”, Dennett thinks that Godfrey-Smith
is mistaken in his “puritanism” intending to keep any and all teleological no-
tions at bay (2011, p. 475). As he points out points out, Godfrey-Smith
leaves it to some extent an open question as to why such thinking is prob-
lematic, especially since he frequently relies on agential language himself.
Given Godfrey-Smith’s expression of strong disapproval, I was expect-
ing a parade of Bad Examples, shocking or embarrassing instances of
agentialists led on a wild goose chase, or blinded to a simpler truth.
But I found none in the book [. . . ]
– Daniel C. Dennett (2011, p. 483)
Dennett overstates his case when he suggests that Godfrey-Smith has (i) not
argued against agential thinking, and (ii) that this critique is central to his
arguments. In many ways, his arguments against agential thinking could be
removed without affecting most of his conclusions regarding the nature of nat-
ural selection. Despite this, Godfrey-Smith urges a rather radical stance on
how agential thinking is to be treated within evolutionary biology. Dennett
is right to note that justification of the severe disapproval of such thinking
throughout the book requires a stronger case, such as providing actual cases
where such thinking has led biologists astray. This problem, however, has not
so far been further addressed by Godfrey-Smith, and his more recent work
on the evolution of consciousness and subjectivity suggests that he might
have even changed his position (Godfrey-Smith 2016a, 2017a,b, 2020; New
England Anti-Vivisection Society et al. 2020).4 There are subtle hints in his
4Indeed, agential language is found throughout his recent monograph Other Minds:
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2009 book, however, that reveal a more nuanced position than just a staunch
puritanism.
Despite their extended discussion on the topic, neither Okasha nor
Godfrey-Smith offer a very precise characterization of what ‘agential think-
ing’ is, instead jumping straight into evaluating its role in evolutionary bi-
ology. But this makes it hard to evaluate just how widespread it is among
evolutionary biologists, why it should be avoided, and how it relates to old
debates about teleological notions. This lack of anything like a canonical
statement in the literature is lamentable, as it could help bring further clarity
to the debate. We suspect that part of the resistance by both Godfrey-Smith
and Okasha to provide such a statement, is the fear that quite a lot of dif-
ferent things are being included under ‘agential thinking’, some of which are
about language, others about explanation, others about styles of modelling,
and probably more. There is a legitimate fear that any statement of agential
thinking that isn’t deliberately vague would leave out some of its instances.
A very simple and general definition, however, could and should have been
provided, if only for the sake of clarity. I propose the following definition:
A brief definition of agential thinking:
Agential thinking is the modeling of an entity or process as making a choice
in order to achieve a goal.
Granted, this is an idealized statement and analysis, but that is precisely why
it will be useful as a philosophical analysis of the status and scientific value
of agential thinking. One direct implication of this definition is that agential
language ought to be more controversial than teleological language since it
appears to require something additional: whereas there is now widespread
agreement among philosophers of biology that the selected-effects accounts
of function5 can naturalize attributions of purposes to traits beyond mere
metaphorical talk, the description of biological entities (or the process of
natural selection itself) in terms of an agent making choices is still seen as
requiring further justification. Yet, agential thinking is described by both
Okasha and Godfrey-Smith as something that is frequently used by evolu-
The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness (2016b). It will hardly be
surprising that many see a close connection between the evolution of agency and conscious-
ness (see Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019; Browning and Veit 2021; Veit 2021b, forthcominga),
but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
5See Millikan (1984); Neander (1983).
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tionary biologists, contradicting the anti-teleological stance that is typical
of the field. This apparent clash between an open embrace of agential lan-
guage and an aversion to teleological language among evolutionary biologists
is puzzling and deserves rigorous philosophical attention.
There are here at least three open questions we can ask: (i) what is
the nature of agential thinking?, (ii) why should agential thinking be avoided
in evolutionary biology?, and (iii) how should we distinguish good from bad
agential reasoning? In this paper, I attempt to at least partially answer these
questions, illuminating the dangers of agential thinking within evolutionary
biology. As Dennett (2011) notes, in order to argue that it should be avoided,
one has “to demonstrate that these are harmful ways of thinking, and that
has not been done [yet]” (p. 484). Agential thinking, compared to teleologi-
cal thinking, has unfortunately been getting the short end of the stick within
the philosophy of biology - perhaps because it was seen as a mere subset of
illicit teleological notions in biology. But this assessment of the relationship
between purpose and agency within evolutionary biology may well turn out
to be wrong, instead each requiring their own distinctive discussions. The
omission of such a discussion shall be remedied here, providing an account
that will strengthen the bite of supposed epithets such as conspiracy theoriz-
ing and Darwinian Paranoia.
Article Outline
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses teleology, agential
thinking, and why we shouldn’t rely on conceptual analysis to address the
legitimacy of agential language in (evolutionary) biology. Section 3 investi-
gates the peculiar psychological pull and usage of agential thinking, arguing
that it is especially hard to escape its temptation and that this should make
us much more wary of applying it too hastily. Section 4 explores a vari-
ety of cases in which agential thinking can lead us in the wrong direction,
providing support for Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) assertion that “when we think
foundationally about evolution, the agential perspective can be seen to steer
us wrongly” (p. 10). Finally, Section 5 covers some remaining objections
and concludes the discussion.
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2 From Teleological to Agential Thinking
In order to make sense of and strengthen Godfrey-Smith’s warning against
agential thinking, it is best to take a minor step backwards and consider
his original motivation. In his 2009 book, Godfrey-Smith sets out on a cru-
sade against typological thinking in biology. Drawing on Ernst Mayr’s (1994)
distinction, he argues that this old conceptual way of treating and under-
standing the living world is of a tenacious sort, and needs to be replaced by
population thinking - here introducing his core idea of a Darwinian Popula-
tion. In order to contrast typological thinking with population thinking in
evolutionary biology, he determines at least three (problematic) elements of
the former. Only one of these is relevant for my analysis of agential think-
ing and stands in a particularly interesting relationship wich such: i.e. the
“teleological outlook on biological activity” (p. 12).
Teleology, Design, and Darwin
As alluded to in the introduction, the subject of teleology has been one of
the most discussed areas in the philosophy of biology (see Allen and Neal
2020). There are two reasons why it is useful here to have a brief discussion
of teleology. Firstly, agential thinking is often seen as a special form of tele-
ological thinking, so whatever consensus is about to emerge on the status of
teleology within biology is undoubtedly going to impact our understanding of
agency. Secondly, naturalist philosophers have long been concerned with the
question of whether talk of purpose, goals, intentions, and functions can be
naturalized or ought to be eliminated from the scientific vocabulary. Before
Darwin, of course, such talk was not only common but seen as irreplaceable.
Those who argue that Darwin banished any telos from the living world often
turn as an analogy to Newton’s banishment of teleology from the physical
realm. Before Newton, things were taken to happen for a reason - not just
a reason, but a raison d’être, i.e. a purpose and not merely a causal pro-
cess explanation.6 Indeed, it was only natural to describe the entire physical
realm as one full of purposes.
Nowadays, however, it would be exceedingly strange to describe physi-
cal processes in teleological terms. Sterelny and Griffiths (1999), in their in-
troduction to philosophy of biology, highlight this difference between biology
6The English language is unfortunately ambiguous in its use of the term ‘reason’ be-
tween these contexts.
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and physics by comparing the heart to the sun; an often discussed example
we can usefully reiterate here. Unlike the function of the heart, which is to
pump blood, no such distinction between ‘purposeful’ and accidental effects
(such as the beating sound of a heart) can be drawn in the case of non-living
entities. The sun has many effects: for instance, it warms all the planets,
and thus enables the continued existence of life on our planet. But as they
point out, the sun is not meant to do anything and not for anything either.
There is no purpose, normativity, or goal-directedness. Without a creator or
designer, who put the sun it its place to ensure our survival, no purpose is to
be had. The latter part is of particular importance here. For the sun to have
a purpose, not only would it have to be placed there by God, but it would
require an intention - an intended effect that explains its existence. This is
why natural selection is treated within selected-effects accounts of function
as a way out of this dilemma: it offers us ‘design without a designer’.
This is nicely illustrated in much of Richard Dawkins’ work, particu-
larly his 1986 book The Blind Watchmaker. Natural selection itself is treated
as a sort of agent, explaining (or explaining away) the ‘purposiveness’ in na-
ture. As I shall argue, natural selection is also the key to understanding, or
rather justifying, agential language. What then distinguishes biology from
physics - or chemistry for that matter - is natural selection, i.e. roughly
the blind ecological filtration of individuals within a population due to the
variation between them. The result are adaptations: traits with a particular
function that they have been selected for. It is not clear, however, what this
would entail for the status of teleology within biology. Many philosophers
(and biologists) have joined this debate, arguably fought since Darwin (1859)
published his On the Origin of Species.
In fact, let us delve quickly into the various verdicts that have been
drawn, starting with Karl Marx:
Despite all deficiencies, not only is a death blow dealt here for the first
time to “teleology” in the natural sciences but their rational meaning
is empirically explained.
– Karl Marx (1861)
Marx offers an interesting interpretation of Darwin’s contribution that Den-
nett (2017) thinks echoes through the entire debate. It is a certain ambiguity
found in the writings of many biologists who routinely refer to functions in
the biological world. Traits, such as the wings of a bird, are for something,
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behaviour is explained by referring to the their rationale, and natural selec-
tion itself is treated as a process of design. How to make sense of this if
Darwin has banished teleology from the natural sciences? Dennett thinks
that the equivocation in Marx’s analysis can be divided into two options:
We should banish all teleological formulations from the natural
sciences
[or]
now that we can “empirically explain” the “rational meaning”
of natural phenomena without ancient ideology (of entelechies,
Intelligent Creators and the like), we can replace old-fashioned
teleology with new, post-Darwinian teleology.
– Daniel C. Dennett (2017, p. 34)
The answer to this question is not as straightforward as the banishment of
teleology from the physical sciences suggests. Godfrey-Smith describes the
result of Darwinism as follows:
Sometimes Darwinism is seen as demolishing the last elements of a
teleological outlook, but at other times Darwinism is seen as construc-
tively domesticating these ideas, showing that they have a limited but
real application to biological processes.
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 12)
Neither Dennett nor Godfrey-Smith sketch the entire continuum of possible
positions however. Here it is useful to compare their options directly.
Let us start on the positive side: if Darwinism can save teleology, to
which extent does it do so? Here, Godfrey-Smith only allows for a limited
domestication of teleology. This certainly sketches the dominant view among
those who think teleology can survive at least to some extent. However, there
is far more radical, niche view that has been popularized and repeatedly
argued for by Dennett himself since at least 1995:
The biosphere is utterly saturated with design, with purpose, with
reasons. What I call the “design stance” predicts and explain features
throughout the living world using the same assumptions that work so
well when reverse-engineering artifacts made by (somewhat) intelligent
human designers.
– Daniel C. Dennett (2017, p. 37)
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In this picture, teleology is not banished, but its rationale transformed with
waves that reach far beyond the usual subject matter of biology.7 We move
from a sort of ‘magical’ or ‘occult’ teleology to a post-Darwinian teleology.
For this design stance to work, natural selection must provide at least a rough
replacement for the prowess of God and provide us with a naturalist form of
biological normativity (Veit 2021a).
The alternative is the complete ‘banishment’ of teleology. Here, Godfrey-
Smith might be read in a stronger way: Darwinism not only banishes teleol-
ogy from the natural sciences but should do so from our entire vocabulary. I
do not think, however, that Godfrey-Smith has such a reading in mind. His
2009 book after all is purely concerned with evolutionary biology. Another
polar opposite to Dennett in this regard is found in Alex Rosenberg’s critique
of Darwinian conspiracy theorizing.
Ever since Newton, physics has ruled out purposes in the physical
realm. If the physical facts fix all the facts, however, then in doing so,
it rules out purposes altogether, in biology, in human affairs, and in
human thought processes too.
– Alex Rosenberg (2013, p. 19)
According to Rosenberg, Darwin not only banished teleology from biology,
but from all of the social sciences and humanities. If Rosenberg is right,
then Darwinism also not only banishes agential thinking from biology, but
even from the humanities; or at least calls their scientific status into question
should it remain. His view would lead us to eliminative materialism - i.e. the
denial of intentional states such as beliefs and desires - not only for other
animals but also for humanity, indeed making their existence a conceptual
impossibility.
This position might not be as absurd as it initially seems: after all,
prior to Newton and Darwin many people believed that teleology was simply
an ineliminable feature of all the ‘domains’ of reality. Noticeably, even Kant
fell victim to this essentialist thinking:
[W]e can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans even to make
such an attempt or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who
could make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass
7See Dennett (1995).
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according to natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather, we
must absolutely deny this insight to human being.
– Immanuel Kant (2000, p. 5:401)
Yet, this is just what Darwin (1859) did, and Rosenberg argues that we
should similarly not reject the eliminative materialist position out of hand.
Natural selection is a blind, foresightless, and definitely intentionless process,
without any need for the guidance of a designer. As Dennett (2017) observes,
philosophers are often too quick to postulate the impossibility of a certain
task, particularly when they are not engaged in, or familiar with, the relevant
empirical research. The reason for Kant’s assertion is, of course, the allure
of agential thinking, something Dennett has called the intentional stance.8
Pre-Darwin, however, it was almost impossible to look at the apparent design
found in nature, and not be convinced of the necessity of an intentional
designer.
Figure 1: The Darwinian Continuum from the Naturalization to the Banishment
of Teleology.
There are at least two options then: either teleology is entirely nat-
uralized or banished. Figure 1 elegantly illustrates the continuum in this
debate. Most thinkers fall somewhere on this spectrum. What connects
the ‘extremes’ - here Rosenberg and Dennett - is their agreement that all of
the historical folk concepts are utterly dissolved in what Dennett (1995) has
dubbed “Darwin’s universal acid”. Thinkers sitting between their radical
views may hold the conviction that Darwin only affects some more limited
domain of intentionality, rationality, goals, purposes, and agency, but both
Dennett and Rosenberg argue that this is a mistake. Whereas one argues
that the concept is too tied up with the manifest image and needs to be elimi-
nated, the other argues that we merely need to revise the concept of teleology
8The allure of this ‘stance’ will be target of section 3.
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by drawing on the resources of science.9 We may reasonably ask how much
disagreement there really is between these thinkers, though their conclusions
could not be more different. Is this a mere difference between seeing the
glass as half-full vs half-empty? Rosenberg (2013) suggests not.10 He asks us
to consider what the difference is between treating “Darwin’s achievement
as expunging purpose from nature versus treating it as making purpose safe
for causality?” (p. 34). I think that this debate comes down to a difference
between the philosophical analysis and explication of concepts. This should
become much clearer once we consider agential thinking, to which we shall
turn now.
Darwinian Conspiracies and Paranoia
Agential thinking has played a surprisingly large role in biology. Not only
are organisms the paradigm case for being regularly treated as agents: since
Dawkins’ 1976 book The Selfish Gene, the genes-eye view of evolution has
become a popular view, that treats genes as agents with their own goals
and motives. Only metaphorically, of course, so Dawkins insists retrospec-
tively regretting the title of his book, preferring the alternative “the immortal
gene”. In the introduction to its 30th year anniversary edition, he writes:
“[m]any critics, especially vociferous ones learned in philosophy as I have
discovered, prefer to read a book by title only” (2006, p. vii).
Dawkins, however, does not think that the ‘gene as agent’ metaphor
is a bad one, but rather that people misunderstood the implications of the
title, wrongly inferring that genes have actual desires and that humans are
inherently selfish rather than altruistic. In fact, he seems to think that
evolution must be thought of in agential terms: “[g]iven that the Darwinian
message is going to be pithily encapsulated as The Selfish Something, that
something turns out to be the gene” (p. viii). Sometimes Dawkins expresses
this quite radically, treating the gene as the only true level of selection, with
the organism being a mere vehicle for (the purposes of) the gene. As Okasha
(2006) and Godfrey-Smith (2009) argued, this sort of essentialist thinking
is a mistake. Godfrey-Smith goes farther than Okasha, however, criticizing
the genes-eye view itself as a flawed mode of agential thinking, rather than a
mere lack of recognition for the other levels of selection. As Godfrey-Smith’s
9See Veit (2018) for an earlier discussion of mine of these different responses to the
nature of ‘purpose’ by Dennett and Rosenberg.
10Dennett (2016) regards a rigid anti-teleological stance as a conceptual mistake.
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warning of agential thinking mayb e considered an overreaching, it is useful
here to look at how Godfrey-Smith describes the agential perspective11:
Evolution is treated as a contest between entities that have purposes,
strategies, and agendas. This sort of description can be applied to
many biological entities; organisms, for example, might be said to
“battle to increase the representation of their genes in future gener-
ations.” But it is often now applied to genes and other replicators
themselves. Replicators act to further their own replication. The
agential perspective on evolution has always been an uneasy mix of
the metaphorical and the literal.
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 10)
While Dennett (2011) agrees there is such a mixture, he does not recognize
this as problematic:
[The mix of metaphorical and the literal is] a feature, not a bug;
it is just another instance of Darwinian anti-essentialism: drawing
a “principled” dividing line between genuine belief-talk or agent-talk
and mere as if belief-talk and agent-talk is the sort of task Jerry Fodor
insists on, pounding his fist on the table, not a methodological maxim
any Darwinian should have any truck with.
– Daniel C. Dennett (2011, p. 481)
Dennett’s reference to Fodor links us to the second puritanist next to Godfrey-
Smith in the debate. Alex Rosenberg (2011) argued that evolution has shaped
us into what he calls conspiracy theorists, making us liable to see plots ev-
erywhere and be dissatisfied with purely mechanistic explanations - even if
that’s all there is. Indeed, as I will argue in Section 3, there is considerable
empirical support from psychology and neuroscience for the peculiar power
this thinking seems to have over our minds, something we should carefully
consider before making any sweeping conclusions. After all, the agential
mode of thinking is employed within biology - for example, even when there
is scientific consensus that bees and other eusocial insects do not possess a
11It is worth noting that when Godfrey-Smith discusses agential thinking, he unfortu-
nately restricts himself to a criticism of the selfish gene point of view - a view he has
several problems with that go beyond those related to agential thinking.
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sufficiently sophisticated cognitive architecture to attribute them with men-
tal states, they are still often described using intentional language.12 As the
quote from Kin Binmore in the epigraph illustrates, rational choice models
and game theory were readily applicable to problems in biology.13 Perhaps
surprisingly, the use of agential thinking in the form of rational choice models
in economics has received more criticism than their counterpart in biology.14
Aristotle, in trying to find an essence to what it means to be human,
defined humans as the rational animal, distinguishing us from other animals
supposedly lacking this trait. The initial knee-jerk reaction of many might
be to simply assert that agential thinking is perfectly legitimate in the case
of humans, but a case of illegitimate anthropomorphism when used on other
animals. But as much work in experimental economics, behavioural eco-
nomics, and psychology more generally shows, we ourselves are far off from
the rational agent model employed in economics, or even folk psychology for
that matter. We tend to rationalize not only the behaviour of others - as
expressed in expressions like ‘what were her reasons?’, ‘what are his beliefs
and desires?’, and ‘why did they do that?’ - but also of ourselves, when
we engage in the post-hoc attribution of beliefs and desires to ourselves in
order to explain past behaviour (see Cushman 2020; Veit et al. 2019). The
success condition for such explanations however, whether in psychology or
economics, is as we shall see, precisely the same as in biology.
An important observation is the fact economists not only use rational
actor models to explain all kinds of human choices, but even the decisions
of organizational entities such as households, firms, and nations, i.e. entities
to which most people would not attribute beliefs and desires. The condi-
tions for decision theory to work here (i.e. to treat these as agents) are the
same as those in the case of agential thinking in biology. Roughly, conflict
between its components needs to be minimized in order to treat the larger
whole as an ‘agent’, whether this is the transition from a group of single-cell
organisms towards a multicellular organism or the transition from a group
of diverse human agents towards a sort of group agency with shared goals
and interests, e.g. a political movement. Indeed, Okasha (2018) explicitly
12Naturally, much the same can be said for genes and groups, both of which are some-
times treated as agents in their own right.
13Simple agent-based models for evolutionary dyamics of say social behaviour can be
intepreted both culturally and genetically (Veit 2019c).
14See for example: Thaler (2015), Sugden (2015), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and
Loewenstein (1999).
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draws on previous work on agency in the philosophy of psychology to defend
an analogous position concerning the use of agential talk in biology:
agency [. . . ] requires a unity-of-purpose both at a time, in order that
we may eliminate conflict among our motives and do one thing rather
than another, and over time, because many of the things we do form
part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these
projects and plans.
– Kennett and Matthews (2003, p. 307)
Accordingly, Okasha (2018) argues that agential thinking applied to an or-
ganism, at least implicitly, presupposes a “unity-of-purpose”, which for him
entails the adaptationist assumption that the organism’s traits all contribute
to a single goal (i.e. fitness-maximization). Even though this definition is
vague, it allows us to draw at least a rough distinction between justified and
unjustified instances of agential thinking, and Okasha argues that just such
a distinction can enable us to keep harmful uses of agential thinking at bay.
The question is then no longer ‘is this really an agent?’ but rather ‘can
we usefully describe this biological phenomenon in agential terms?’ I am
thus rejecting the idea that the properties of biological entities must conform
to what philosophers have often described as ‘conceptual analysis’, i.e. the
investigation of the social, linguistic, or perhaps even ‘true’ meaning of a
term. Instead, I am interested in concepts in the sense of explication (Carnap
1950) or naturalist conceptual engineering (Veit and Browning 2020). This
approach is pragmatic and revisionist in nature and asks whether we can
construct the concept of agency in such a way as to play a useful role in
biology.
Figure 2: The Darwinian Continuum from Explication to the Conceptual Analysis
of Agential Language.
This brief interlude enables us to draw some important distinctions
and sketch an alternative continuum of the debate in Figure 2. Putting the
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positions in the debate on a line allows us to emphasize a crucial difference
between Rosenberg’s critique of agential thinking as “conspiracy theorizing”
and Godfrey-Smith’s “Darwinian paranoia”. Rosenberg’s argument is fun-
damentally a metaphysical one grounded in conceptual analysis. Because
he thinks that there really are no agents in nature, he asserts that agential
explanations must always be inadequate. Godfrey-Smith’s worry is different.
Even if there are agents, it is not the case that all evolutionary processes in-
volve agents, and certainly not in any essentialist manner. Agential thinking,
however - as we shall see in the following section - has a strong psychological
force that inevitably invites such essentialist thinking. It can, hence, lead us
astray when thinking about evolution.
What matters then, is whether agential talk in biology can play im-
portant roles. Godfrey-Smith and Okasha, despite different conclusions in
regards to the legitimacy of agential talk can therefore be placed roughly in
the middle between Dennettian revisionist explication and traditional con-
ceptual analysis of the sort Rosenberg engages in. Here, I am not interested
in the more traditional philosophical project of trying to understand what
agential talk ‘truly’ consists in, but the methodological project of trying to
determine the benefits and costs of agential thinking in (evolutionary) biol-
ogy. Unfortunately, I suspect that the psychological allure of this mode of
thinking has stopped us from seriously investigating the ways it can lead us
astray. Let us therefore now turn its peculiar psychological pull and how
agential thinking is used in practice.
3 The Psychological Pull and Usage of Agen-
tial Thinking
In the previous section, I have argued that the question of agential language
in biology requires explication, rather than conceptual analysis. Neverthe-
less, if Rosenberg is right, and agential thinking is an unavoidable feature of
our evolved human psychology, we should strongly resist any initially plau-
sible story of the apparent usefulness of agential thinking, as it may also
be an artifact of this credulous tendency. Dennett, for instance, seems to
prematurely buy into the usefulness of agential thinking through his com-
mitment to adaptationism. Okasha (2019) describes the difference between
himself and Dennett as one of emphasis, himself favouring a neutral position
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on the status of adaptation in nature. Because of Dennett’s anti-essentialist
position and his stance that design is ubiquitous in nature, he is quick to
become a strong defender of agential thinking:
Peter Godfrey-Smith may call this “Darwinian paranoia” and Alex
Rosenberg may call it a “conspiracy theory.” These are just the latest
overreactions to the recognition that the intentional stance is a strate-
gic tool of undeniable power, not a describer of unvarnished facts.
Sometimes, they should realize, varnish is just what is called for, an
indispensable Good Trick.
– Daniel C. Dennett (2013, p. 62)
Okasha (2018) similarly views agential thinking as a type of adaptationist
thinking with the implicit rationale “to understand evolved traits in terms
of their contribution to fitness” (p. 2). I think this is a mistake. It confuses
the purported justification of agential thinking with the internal structure of
its logic. Agential thinking in biology goes farther back than the discipline
itself, and more importantly, predates Darwin’s theory of natural selection.
Though talk of agents and goals in evolution is rarely intended to be
literal, Okasha (2018) argues that the use of agential language within bi-
ology should satisfy higher criteria for application, such as the presence of
behavioural plasticity. This is somewhat surprising, as Okasha himself notes
that agential thinking can come in a variety of modes. Out of these, he draws
a general distinction between two types of agential thinking in evolutionary
biology: one concerning the process of natural selection the product, the
other concerning its product itself.
Let us start with a kind of agential thinking Okasha (2018) suggests
we should discard entirely: Type 2 thinking, that treats natural selection
as an agent itself – mother nature. While Dennett (2017) frequently en-
gages in this way of thinking, Okasha (2018; 2019) insists that it should be
avoided, because it reinforces the common misconception of natural selection
as a directed process, leading to ever-higher fitness, and perfectly adapted
organisms. The agential metaphor, hence, invites a way of thinking about
evolution that gets things wrong. The problem is decidedly not that natural
selection is not actually an agent with beliefs and desires, but that invites an
erroneous way of thinking about evolution.
Type 1, Okasha argues, is the more familiar form of agential thinking
that treats genes, organisms, or groups as ‘rational agents’ in their own right.
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This way of thinking is familiar from economics, where we can treat firms or
households as agents even though any ‘conceptual analysis’ of the idea would
fail to classify them as such. What matters is that multicellular organisms,
i.e. groups of single cells, can only be usefully treated as an agent if they have
a “unity of purpose”, which is just the justification used when applying the
rational-agent model in economics to group entities. Agential models need
not presuppose intentional states, but perhaps a sort of ‘goal-directedness’ is
needed, one that justifies talk of what an entitity is ‘trying to achieve’, i.e.
agential thinking.
In a recent review of Okasha (2018), Gardner (2019) offers a slightly
misguided criticism. He suggests that there is nothing odd about agential
thinking, even when there is consensus that, say, ants do not have beliefs (at
least in any sophisticated human sense). Agential thinking here is merely a
form of modelling, idealizing the world and thereby emphasising some im-
portant features of the world, such as the population dynamics of different
strategies studied in evolutionary game theory. Insisting that all models are
technically false will not do, however, as Okasha (2019) points out: the mere
fact that many evolutionary biologists frequently engage in agential thinking
does not attest to its usefulness, if there are compelling reasons to believe
that it is an almost addictive way of thinking, applied even when there is
no clear benefit what the agential perspective has to offer. Gardner makes
an important assertion when he argues that agential thinking allows us to
understand evolutionary phenomena that would have otherwise remained
mysterious. Dawkins’ idea of a Selfish Gene and Maynard Smith’s introduc-
tion of evolutionary game theory to biology are perhaps two wonderful cases
for the benefits the agential perspective has to offer. However, this does not
provide the agential mode of thinking with a get-out-of-jail-free card, if it -
as I shall argue in Section 4 - also obscures the understanding of biology,
and in particular evolution.
As Godfrey-Smith points out, “all talk of benefits and agendas comes
with a peculiar psychological power” (2009, p. 10). Unsurprisingly Dennett
(2011) responds that this ‘peculiar power’ is the “power of the intentional
stance (Dennett 1971; 1987)” to treat entities as agents with beliefs and de-
sires (p. 481). Dennett goes on to argue that the intentional stance “enables
us to think strategically about all manner of phenomena, from our fellow hu-
man beings and animals, to computers and even to evolutionary processes”
(p. 481). The easy attribution of plots, goals, and intentions to objects
in the biological world are not merely creative inventions by commentators.
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Rather, they highlight a particular fact about human psychology, one that
that has long been emphasized by Dennett. Indeed, one may be tempted to
treat agential thinking as merely one instance of the intentional stance, i.e.
as applied to (evolutionary) biology. My minimal definition certainly lends
itself to that, though I suspect that agential choice alone need not always
imply a firm intentional stance with the attribution of beliefs and desires.
Rather, the intentional stance can be understood as the psychological pull
underlying agential thinking in evolutionary biology.
Here it is best to quote Dennett (1987) directly from The Intentional
Stance:
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose be-
havior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what
beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its
purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the
same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent
will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practi-
cal reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most
instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is
what you predict the agent will do.
– Daniel C. Dennett (1987, p. 17)
What matters for the intentional stance are fundamentally pragmatic con-
siderations of the sort: is it useful to think of x as an agent? Nevertheless,
Dennett thinks this is all there is to it. Using the intentional stance we
are able to discover ‘real patterns’ or stable regularities in nature that are
perfectly able to ground talk of agency. There is a problem, however, when
this agential mode of thinking highlights particular, perhaps unimportant,
patterns, and clouds others with more scientific relevance. As Davies (2010)
points out, microbiologists - contrary to popular belief - happily anthropo-
morphise their targets of analysis, a move that can have harmful consequences
for our understanding of the biological world, as I will illustrate in Section
4. Indeed, I think that it is all too easy to attribute (minimal) intentional-
ity. Dennett’s anti-essentialism simply embraces this. There is no essential
difference between the preferences of, say, a thermostat, and an adult human
being. The difference is merely one of complexity and sophistication. Both,
according to Dennett can be usefully treated as agents.
The neuroscientist Michael Graziano (2016) offers perhaps the best
support for Dennett’s intentional stance as a psychologically tempting phe-
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nomenon. Unlike many others, Graziano is better able to get ideas across in
talks than in papers or books. Indeed, there might be is an important gap
between the idea of the intentional stance in the abstract and in practice. In
order to demonstrate this, Graziano only requires one little helper: a small
orangutan puppet named Kevin. If one attends a talk on consciousness by
Graziano - a experienced ventriloquist - it is almost certain that Kevin will
play an important role. Graziano (2016) argues that in some sense conscious-
ness can be considered an illusion (though he would deny this), a useful trick
that our brains evolved to play in order to navigate us through social situa-
tions. By engaging in brief conversations with Kevin, Graziano emphasizes
the impossibility not to feel a sense of Kevin’s awareness, consciousness, and
intentionality. Of course, we all know (with perhaps the exception of very
young children) that Kevin is not really conscious, but one cannot stop our
brain from instinctively applying the intentional stance.
This tendency is often very useful. It enables us not only to enjoy an-
imated movies, which would be impossible without attributing agency, but
is also applied to ourselves. As Sellars (1963; 2007) has repeatedly argued,
we do not come to understand ourselves and others as mere vehicles of evo-
lutionary change, but rather as rational agents subject to the operation of
norms. We have a ‘theory’ of mind that makes us liable to attribute agency
across the board. Indeed, as Rosenberg (2011) points out, this shapes us
into conspiracy theorists, enabling us to see plots everywhere in nature, and
makes us addicted to stories. Rosenberg argues that it was precisely this
more or less sophisticated theory of mind that enabled us to climb from the
brink of extinction in the Savannah to the most ‘influential’ species on our
planet.
This is emphasized even further by the Moving Shapes Paradigm de-
veloped by Heider, Simmel, and College (1944). In their original experiment
they showed adults an animated clip in which a circle and two triangles move
in and out of a larger square, with a sort of door. This is already a use of
our ability to see purposes everywhere, even a mere two-dimensional and
incredible simple animation. Adults and children attribute intentions and
goals (i.e. agency) to these shapes. These surprising results from experimen-
tal psychology suggest that we should be careful when attributing agency,
when there is a strong psychological pull even to attribute mental life to mere
two-dimensional forms.
Now we can make sense of Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) assertion that agen-
tial thinking “engages a particular set of concepts and habits: our cognitive
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tools for navigating the social world” (p. 10). Indeed, let us return to
Gardner (2019) who - while maintaining that we can, in principle, do all of
evolutionary biology in terms of agent-free population genetics - is convinced
that agential thinking facilitates scientific progress. This echoes the senti-
ment of David Haig (2012), another evolutionary biologist, who is similarly
convinced of the importance of agential thinking - that it is a “way for us
to be smart” (Godfrey-Smith 2009, p. 10). Drawing on the evolutionary
psychologists Cosmides and Tooby (1992), Godfrey-Smith argues, similarly
to Rosenberg, that our minds are particularly powerful in dealing with social
situations containing human agents. However, this need not be a benefit in
scientific investigations. As Godfrey-Smith notes: “[w]hen we think about
agents and agendas, we think differently and more acutely than we do about
abstract logical and causal relations” (2009, p. 10). Evolutionary theorists
may thus tempted to rely on their evolved cognitive machinery to analyse
the more ‘strategic’ aspects of evolution, as for instance Maynard Smith and
Price (1973).
We should thus now be able to make sense of Godfrey-Smith’s argument
against ‘Darwinian Paranoia’:
And once taken up or switched on, these are psychological tools that
are hard to put down; they have a compelling, almost addictive, nar-
rative appeal, and tend to send us down specific paths. This claim,
again, applies to all agential views of evolution, not just those invok-
ing replicators. But the introduction of small and hidden agents has a
particular power. It can lead to an acute form of what Richard Fran-
cis (2004) has—dramatically but accurately—called “Darwinian para-
noia.” Darwinian paranoia is the tendency to think of all evolutionary
outcomes in terms of reasons, plots, and strategies. An agenda is a
powerful explainer. Once introduced to the possibility of understand-
ing a phenomenon in terms of a grand rationale, we become reluctant
to settle for less. One agenda might be exchanged for another, but
this becomes the kind of understanding we are after. The application
of an agenda to the empirical facts might be indirect and constrained,
but an agenda “makes sense” of things for us in a way that no mere
catalog of efficient causes can.
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 10)
The problem with these assertions is that Godfrey-Smith only provides sparse
evidence that this way of thinking actually misleads biologists. I nevertheless
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hope to have here given a much firmer foundation for the strong opposition
Godfrey-Smith holds against agential thinking, with its psychological pull be-
ing confused with actual explanatory power. By contrast, Robert Wilson’s
(2005) minimal conception of agency as something that is merely physically
bounded and play some causal role, stands on much shakier ground, com-
pared to my goal-centric definition given above. Indeed, it serves to illustrate
how easy it is to think that the agential mode of thinking provides something
distinctly valuable. As Godfrey-Smith (2009) points out, Wilson could count
any causal ‘individual’ as an agent, be it a “carbon atom or a brick” (p. 11).
But why should we? The question we have to ask here is the Dennettian one:
cui bono; who benefits? But the target is different: how does it benefit scien-
tists to engage in this attractive, albeit misleading sort of talk, if it benefits
them at all? It is now that I will turn to the dangers of agential thinking,
a discussion that must focus on actual scientific practice. As Okasha (2018)
notes, the “ultimate justification [for agential thinking] is empirical rather
than theoretical” (p. 230). Let us therefore now move to discussion of a set
of examples that should satisfy at least some of the initial ‘thirst’ Dennett
exhibits for when he demands a “parade of Bad Examples, shocking or em-
barrassing instances of agentialists led on a wild goose chase, or blinded to a
simpler truth” (2011, p. 483).
4 The Dangers of Agential Thinking
Despite the insistence of many biologists that teleology has no role in bi-
ology, agential thinking plays a surprisingly large role in biological theory.
This might suggest that agential thinking is unproblematic, as long as it is
merely taken to be metaphorical. This, however, is a mistake. In this sec-
tion, I attempt to draw attention to an open question that I raised in the
conclusion of a paper on the role of cheaters in the evolution of multicellular-
ity: what is the actual impact of anthropomorphic language on research?15
While there has been some engagement with the role of agential thinking
regarding higher vertebrates (see Kennedy 1992), I am here more interested
with more basic evolutionary units. No one can deny that agential thinking
has often played a useful role in evolutionary biology, however, one should
also consider the dangers of such thinking. That a metaphor can be useful is
15See Veit (2019a).
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trivial. To merely show examples in which it is useful is not the same as le-
gitimizing its widespread usage. Even if agential thinking can play a positive
role in evolutionary biology, this may be utterly outweighed by the poten-
tial negative effects such thinking invites. Hitherto, however, debates on
agential thinking have mostly focused on ontological concerns, an indicative
complaint being something like “but corvids are not really plotting”. Such
ontological concerns are to some degree separate from the usefulness such
thinking might otherwise provide. Usefulness alone, however, is not enough
when the negative effects of such thinking outweigh the positive ones. It is a
serious omission in the literature that this issue has not yet received sufficient
attention. Accordingly, I argue that there are at least two distinct problems
with agential language that have a negative effect on evolutionary biology:
(i) the restriction of scientific creativity, and (ii) the revival of essentialist
thinking.
Restriction of Scientific Creativity
The first problem I shall address concerns the restriction of scientific cre-
ativity and generation of alternative ways of thinking. This problem may
seem odd at first sight, given that agential thinking is commonly defended in
virtue of its success in promoting creativity and the generation of new and
fruitful hypotheses. By treating a biological system or natural selection as
an agent, we can use a particular way of thinking that is familiar from engi-
neering, i.e. reverse engineering.16 If a biological system seems to pursue one
or more goals, we can ask how it is able to pursue these goals. Furthermore,
it allows for a forward-looking perspective of evolution. Given an organism
with apparent ‘goals’, we may ask what phenotypic changes would allow for
an improvement in the pursuit of these goals and thus potentially predict
future change.
These points are well taken, however, there is no necessary inconsis-
tency here with the idea that agential thinking can prevent the generation of
new hypotheses that are at odds with the agential descriptions, particularly
when agency and goals are misdescribed. A conceptual tool might be useful
for some purposes, but utterly mislead us when applied to an inappropriate
context. This is not simply the claim that metaphors are misleading when
used outside of their correct context.17 Rather, my methodological point is
16A point vigorously defended by Dennett (2017).
17I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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that the psychological pull of agential thinking, and its usefulness in some
cases, have led to an epistemic culture within some domains of evolutionary
biology in which ideas will be expressed in agential form. This will then
actually restrict, rather than aid, our imaginative capacities.
If a challenge is made to this method of modeling of evolution in terms
of agents making choices, its proponents (such as Gardner or Dennett, as I
have discussed in the previous sections), will misread the very objective of
Okasha’s 2018 monograph into one about the ontological status of agency,
or even a flat-out endorsement. It is not surprising that Dennett (2019)
treats Okasha as a guide and proof for the usefulness and almost inevitabil-
ity of agential thinking, when Okasha’s motivation was only to tease out its
methodological limits. And it is this part of his work that left both adapta-
tionists unfazed. Unfortunately, here I will have to partially side with both
Dennett and Gardner. While philosophical analysis has its virtues, scientists
have rarely been convinced by methodological arguments from the armchair.
To show that a particular way of modelling is flawed and should be used
much more carefully must involve actual cases in science. We need to see
where agential thinking has led us horribly astray and proved itself to be
more akin to blinkers, rather than a useful lens through which to see the
world. After all, it is within science itself that a particular mode of thinking
must stand trial. Since such a parade of empirical examples has neither been
provided by Godfrey-Smith nor Okasha, I will try to remedy this here.
The first example comes from recent work by Paul B. Rainey, an exper-
imental biologist looking at the transition to multicellularity through the role
of ‘cheats’ rather than the traditional emphasis on co-operation (Rainey and
Kerr 2010; Veit 2019a). Using the Pseudomonas fluorescens wrinkly spreader
system, Hammerschmidt et al. (2014) initially propagated 140 beakers with
a P. fluorescens population. While the ancestral population of these single-
cell eukaryotes (SM = smooth) floats individually within the broth, muta-
tions quickly occur within them leading to a new phenotype (WS = wrinkly
spreader) of cell-cell glue production.18 Under usual conditions these WS
cells normally have a lower fitness than their SM counterparts. Due to the
adhesive, daughter cells are unable to detach themselves from their parents,
suffering the costs of glue-production and a life in close proximity. However,
though non-buoyant, these groups of WS cells are able to attach themselves
at wall of the beaker, taking over the interface between broth and air. This
18A variety of alternative mutations allows for this phenotype.
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allows them to reap the benefits of access to oxygen by contributing to this
public good, taking over the entire surface. Due to their high mutation rate,
however, ‘cheats’ arise that, while benefiting from their access to oxygen
within the mat, do not provide the stabilizing cell-cell glue necessary to keep
the integrity of the mat. These cheats quickly multiply and lead to the fall
(i.e. doom) of the mat. While groups of such previously solitarily living
cells quickly arise in the course of evolution, these ‘group entities’ go extinct
just as quickly.19 At this point, Rainey and Kerr (2010) have suggested that
these cheats, while causing the ‘doom’ of the mat, could also serve as their
‘savior’ by playing the role of propagules able to detach themselves from the
inevitable fate of the group.
In their experiment, Hammerschmidt et al. (2014) were able to show
that - perhaps counterintuitively - a cheat-embracing life-cycle achieved a
higher fitness for the ‘group’ than a cheat-purging regime. These surprising
results have not gone unnoticed. In a recent article on the study of social
behavior in microbiology, Corina Tarnita (2017) offered an entire section on
“The dangers of anthropomorphizing: when does cooperation cease to be
a useful concept?” (p. 21). Drawing on Rainey’s work, she argues that
value-laden terms such as cooperation and cheating should be omitted and
replaced with neutral ones.20 I have also raised this problem in my philo-
sophical analysis of Rainey’s experiments: “by questioning the very notion of
cheats being always bad simply in virtue of their evaluative name [...] game-
theoretic analyses, excluding such roles for cheats, must necessarily cloud the
generation of new hypotheses” (2019a, p. 17). If anthropomorphic agential
language is merely metaphorical and heuristic, one may wonder whether this
danger is a serious one. In hindsight, however, Rainey’s hypothesis may be
considered as an almost obvious solution - so simple and trivial, in fact, that
one might wonder why no one came up with this explanation before. I ar-
gued that Rainey’s research project calls for a reconceptualization of cheats,
but there is an alternative conclusion - that is to insist that we were merely
mistaken in treating these proto-propagules as cheats to begin with. If it was
a mistake, the question arises as to where the mistake resides – is it treating
them as cheats when they are in fact not, or in the very act of thinking in
agential terms? As this distinction reveals, it is far from easy to judge a
19But as Hammerschmidt et al. (2014) argue, it is not meaningful to speak here of a
Darwinian individual in its own right, unless it has some way of reproduction. See also
Okasha (2006) and Godfrey-Smith (2009).
20See also Davies (2004).
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priori whether an application of the intentional stance is going to be useful
or harmful.
A second similar example comes from the work of Tarnita (2017), who
suggests a positive role for cheats in the bacterium Myxococcus xanthus. She
argues that a positive role for cheats can be recognized once evolutionary
innovations are introduced into the equation (see also Fiegna et al. 2006).
Innovations, however, are rarely if ever considered in evolutionary models
of cooperation that mostly focus on two strategies, i.e. cooperation and
cheating. This, while perhaps appropriate in behavioural ethology, does not
neatly transfer to experimental evolution studies in microbiology. Tarnita
argues that mutations, and hence innovations, play a much bigger role when
natural selection is operating on a faster time scale.
M. xanthus is a species of predatory myxobacteria that live in a variety
of population structures. Usually these bacteria can be found living together
in a loose swarm in the form of a biofilm. What makes this species par-
ticularly interesting, however, is their complex multi-cellular developmental
life-cycle when exposed to a lack of nutrition. Under conditions of starvation,
these bacteria form fruiting bodies, of which only some will survive as spores.
A costly process such as this clearly allows for the possibility of cheats. But
as we have seen, this need not be a problem for the evolution of multicellular
organisms.
One such cheater fails to produce viable spores in monoculture, which
makes it an obligate social cheater whose survival during starvation is
dependent upon chimeric fruiting body development with a social host.
In lab experiments, this obligate cheater, which led to the downfall of
cooperation, eventually mutated into a novel social type; moreover, it
did so via mutations that generated novel genetic interactions rather
than by a simple reversal of its defects. Thus, ‘a temporary state of
obligate cheating served as an evolutionary stepping-stone to a novel
state of autonomous social dominance’ (Fiegna et al., 2006).
– Corina E. Tarnita (2017, p. 22)
Tarnita uses these two examples, stemming from experimental evolution
studies on P. fluorescens and M. xanthus, to advocate a replacement of terms
such as cheat and cooperator by “[m]ore neutral terms such as producers and
non-producers [. . . ] as they allow for multiple alternative hypotheses to be
considered” (p. 22). Tarnita makes a stronger claim here than my sug-
gestion that this sort of anthropomorphic language makes the generation of
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alternative hypotheses more difficult. She seems to argue that anthropomor-
phic language leads to the complete abandonment of hypotheses that conflict
with the value-laden nature of terms such as cheats.
This stronger claim is not without appeal. Rather than being tested,
hypotheses - such as Rainey’s cheats as proto-germline hypothesis - might
initially be discarded because of the mental association of cheating with
something bad and something to be avoided, i.e. a problem that requires
solving. That there is the potential for agential language to lead science
astray is well accepted. However, biologists may underestimate the extent
of these dangers, judging them to be outweighed by the benefits of agential
thinking. It is, as Tarnita points out, precisely because we understand the
causal mechanisms of social behaviour better in the case of eusocial insects
than the evolution of multicellularity that the ascription of agency seems
less problematic in the former. But in that case the work was not done by
agential thinking alone; rather agential thinking of a particular sort becomes
justified.
Does agential thinking block the generation of hypothesis entirely? No,
but agential thinking may make initially counterintuitive results seem far less
attractive, and even absurd. Unlike other modes of thinking, it has a unique
psychological gravity that makes it hard to think in non-agential terms once
one has entered into its sphere, positively stifling scientific creativity and
progress. These examples will help to understand why Godfrey-Smith warns
of agential thinking as a return to older essentialist ways of carving up the
world.
The Revival of Essentialism
The only example of agential thinking that Godfrey-Smith discusses in detail
concerns the genes-as-replicators view. Dennett (2011) does him an injus-
tice by not considering his arguments in detail. Indeed, I will argue that
despite Dennett’s insistence that agential thinking can be thought of in non-
essentialist terms, this way of thinking is particularly vulnerable to falling
back into essentialism. The second danger of agential thinking within bi-
ology we shall explore is thus the revival of essentialism. The discussions
about natural selection, selfish genes, and multi-level selection significantly
shaped evolutionary biology over the last forty years (see Okasha 2006 for an
overview). Godfrey-Smith sees agential thinking as an unfortunate side-effect
of this process, however:
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This process was accompanied by successive shifts in use of the lan-
guage of agency and benefit. Such language often has a significant
communicative role. When a student is told that the gene is the
ultimate unit of evolutionary self-interest, for example, he or she
is supposed to hear that as gesturing towards one family of evolu-
tionary mechanisms—which can be more precisely described in other
terms—and away from another. In the case of descriptions from a
genic point of view, however, these formulations developed an un-
usual power and role. They became more than a shorthand, being
used not just to summarize complicated ideas but to shape founda-
tional descriptions of evolution.
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 143)
One might read into this passage that the agential mode can lead us away
from alternative hypotheses, but it seems more likely that Godfrey-Smith
intends this as a critique of the gene as the sole ‘benefector’ of evolution.
Indeed, he argues that the replicator approach has been deliberately con-
structed to fit an agential understanding of evolution. Dawkins (1976), in
The Selfish Gene, frequently talks of goals, strategies, and interests. Godfrey-
Smith (2009) does not consider the Dennettian approach of treating this talk
as genuine, an approach that - though interesting - does not seem to capture
the way agentialists like Dawkins, Haig, and Gardner defend their accounts
as mere heuristics. To some extent, Dennett’s approach rests on the success
of agential thinking, but as I have discussed, this needs to be demonstrated
itself.
Godfrey-Smith sees Dawkin’s Selfish Gene concept as something dis-
tinctively born out of an agential view on natural selection:
What is true is that if we want to describe evolution using an agential
framework, where a process extended over long periods is described
in terms of the pursuit of goals by some entity, then that entity must
persist, at least in the form of copies. Otherwise it cannot realize or
fail to realize its goals. So within the framework that collapses popu-
lational processes to the activities of agents, Dawkins is expressing a
real constraint. But that is an argument against the agential frame-
work—an argument that it cannot be applied to all cases. It is not
an argument that evolution cannot occur unless long-term persisting
entities are present. So it is not just overtly teleological features that
the agential framework imputes to evolution—features which we can
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quickly say are only being metaphorically attributed. Subtle struc-
tural features are being imposed as well. The agential framework
treats the evolutionary process in terms of the persistence of special
entities through superficial change, rather than in terms of the succes-
sive creation of new entities, with similarities and other dissimilarities
to earlier entities.
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 5)
Indeed, Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) book Darwinian Populations and Natural
Selection is one extended treatment of this mistaken idea. Natural selection
does not require agents to receive benefits – there are many proto, sort-of,
marginal cases of evolution - perhaps even the majority - that do not neatly
fit into the paradigm conception of natural selection as operating on neatly
delineated individuals. It is precisely those other cases where an agential
view is problematic. An important further instance of this is the role of
the immune system (Pradeu 2011) that perhaps altogether undermines the
idea of eukaryotes as individuals; which is not to deny that we can treat
individuality as a useful model. Gene-thinking is not a replacement but
rather an instance of agential thinking, as the following quote by Patten
(2019) illustrates: “[t]he self looks more like a democracy comprising various
political factions when genetic conflicts are recognized” (p. 89). So it is
precisely essentialism we need to be concerned about.
Overtly agential description of evolution is part of a larger family, or a
graded series, of metaphorically loaded usages. At the extreme end we
have talk of strategies and cabals. These shade into less tendentious
talk of welfare and goals, and those shade into talk of costs and ben-
efits understood directly in terms of components of fitness—chance
of survival, number of matings, and so on. It can be unclear where
metaphor ends and literal usage begins. Talk of this kind can also
have several different intended roles. It may be seen as a metaphor-
ical expression of a deep truth (as in Dawkins 1976), or merely as a
practical tool for thinking about some complex matters in a simple
way (Haig 1997).
– Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 142)
I think it is here that Godfrey-Smith points to a slippery slope towards essen-
tialism. As Section 3 illustrated, there is something particularly addictive
about agential thinking, drawing on an old but ingrained way of thinking.
29
If it was merely a practical tool like other models this would be unprob-
lematic, but that is not the case, and hence deserves thorough philosophical
treatment. Many evolutionary biologists appear to skip over the important
difficulties in agential thinking, but as the foregoing analysis should demon-
strate there are no easy answers, and many biologists would be well-advised
to take these issues more seriously.
Sometimes biologists might shrug this off by saying that it is merely a
perspective, one of multiple angles we might take: the gene, the organism,
or perhaps the group. But if there are various alternative ways to attribute
agency, of which only one is right, this already suggests that agential thinking
- while helpful for the generation of new hypotheses - can also often have a
negative effect by misplacing the ‘goals’ of units subject to natural selection.
Even the simplest living systems have a sort of directedness, as often empha-
sized by Godfrey-Smith, but what are they directed towards? The answer is
simple: goals. Goals of course, very thinly, are simply to be understood as
something an organism needs to strive towards in order to increase its fitness.
This, however, can be put in entirely neutral and mechanistic terms, without
any need for agential descriptions and the risks that accompany such usage.
5 Concluding Discussion
As the foregoing section illustrated, agential thinking is intertwined with a
complex array of philosophical and empirical problems. If my presentation
here succeeded, I should have convinced the reader that agential thinking in
biology, contrary to Dennett, is neither indispensable nor always a good trick.
Instead, we need to recognize that agential thinking is a double-edged sword
with a lot of anthropomorphic baggage. It can help us to come up with new
hypotheses and alternative explanations, but these are liable to be completely
off-track and may cloud the right explanations in a shroud of non-agential
fog. Once we have begun to think in agential terms about a particular area
of evolutionary biology it can be hard to stop, creating an agential gravity
that hinders scientific creativity like blinkers on a horse. A useful lens is
then turned into a dogma of necessity. Where agential thinking works, it is
because we have correctly determined the units of selection and the adaptive
pressures. This is often the case and seems to be what Okasha (2018) has
in mind when he argues that agential thinking of type 1 is frequently useful.
But in this scenario, it is unclear what the agential perspective adds beyond
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perhaps neatly summarizing what we know. As it seems we are - as Godfrey-
Smith (2009) seems to argue - perfectly able to replace agential by neutral
talk. Perhaps agential thinking can serve as a useful bridge prior to an
analysis of the biological mechanisms and processes, but as Rainey’s work on
‘cheats’ illustrates, the opposite might also be true. Agential thinking can
serve as a troll on a bridge, making it impossible to cross towards a deeper
understanding of the biological phenomena.
This seems to be closer to Godfrey-Smith’s understanding of agential
thinking as something that is inherently bound up with old philosophical
ways of thinking, a way of thinking that is liable to mislead us when applied
to evolution. These folk concepts, similar to our folk physics, cannot just
be discarded. Even a Nobel Prize-winning physicist might be unable to es-
cape their intuitive folk psychological notions of how physics works. Much
of science goes against ‘common sense’, so we should be open to challenging
received wisdom of what are good, legitimate, and more importantly nec-
essary ways of understanding particular phenomena. Before Newton, many
thought that there was no way to conceive of the world without purposes,
and to some extent these thinkers were right. If one survives the climb to the
summit of Mt. Everest one might feel hard-pressed not to be overcome by a
sense of pathos – that there must be some sense to all this beauty.21 Even
the die-hard physicalist will not deny that it seems like there is more, but
there is nothing explanatory in this ‘seeming’, almost as if there was a cre-
ator, a designer above the clouds. Similarly, indeed, with much more force,
natural selection has shaped us into agency-detectors that makes it almost
impossible for us not to interpret the behaviour of other animals in rational
terms. This approach will often work in the case of animal agents, allowing
us to discover something Dennett (2017) has repeatedly called “free-floating
rationales”, but once we turn to the fundamental workings of nature and life,
this way of thinking is liable to get things wrong. As Veit et al. (2019) argue,
there is a ‘Rationale of Rationalization’, but this rationale has evolved for a
specific purpose, one that above all helps to predict the behaviour of others
and discover some adaptative rationales, not to discover how natural selec-
tion operates in the abstract.22 As Tarnita (2017) points out, it is precisely
because we have gained such a detailed understanding of eusocial insects
21Assuming one did not reach the summit in a snow-storm and is hence unable to see
anything beyond a one meter radius.
22In a forthcoming paper, I argue that we can understand natural selection itself as an
ecologically scaffolded process (see Veit forthcomingc).
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that it does not seem harmful to apply agential language to them. From
slave-making ants to dancing bees there is no shortage of agential descrip-
tions. It is unclear, however, what role agential language played here beyond
the forming of some hypotheses. The context of discovery and the context
of justification, are indeed sometimes quite distinct. Godfrey-Smith is right
then, as much work on the major transitions and the units of selection shows
the agential perspective can easily lead us astray. Work by neuroscientists
and psychologists should make us wary of these dangers and try especially
hard to resist the temptation of agential thinking. It is not just an alter-
native modelling strategy that we should simply embrace for the sake of a
diversity of different models as some scientific pluralists may argue.23 Yet, I
have previously expressed doubts that traditional game-theoretic terms such
as cooperator and cheat can be, as Tarnita seems to suggest, “cast-off over
night” (Veit 2019a, p. 17). The foregoing analysis shows why it is so hard
to banish agential thinking from evolutionary biology. But there are further,
more sociological, reasons that could also be considered troubling. Indeed,
articles that are published with attractive titles, including agential terms
such as cheaters, slave-making, choice, queens and kinds might be easier
to publish and reach a larger audience. More careful articles, with neutral
headlines, seem to have less of an impact factor, as measured by citations.
In some sense, agential language allows even uneducated readers to skip over
the biological details, quickly grasping some important information. This is
of particular importance in science communication. In light of this, the best
we can do is to develop our theories further and understand these biological
systems, such that agential language is no longer misleading, but it is unlikely
that we will ever be able to banish it entirely.
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